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The (Re)Discovery of the
Proportionality Principle in
Sentencing in Ipeelee:
Constitutionalization and the
Emergence of Collective
Responsibility
Marie-Eve Sylvestre*

I. INTRODUCTION
Proportionality in sentencing, which requires that a sentence must be
proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender,1 has repeatedly been recognized as the fundamental
principle of sentencing by Canadian courts.2 Despite its long-established

*
Faculty of Law (Civil Law Section), University of Ottawa. I would like to thank my
colleagues André Jodouin, Manon Lapointe, Julie Desrosiers and Benjamin Berger for their
comments and suggestions, as well as the organizers of the 2012 Osgoode Hall Constitutional Cases
Conference for providing the opportunity to reflect on this important decision.
1
Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter “Code”].
2
R. v. Proulx, [2000] S.C.J. No. 6, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, at para. 54 (S.C.C.): “For instance,
the principle of proportionality, set out in s. 718.1 as the fundamental principle of sentencing, directs
that all sentences must be proportional to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility
of the offender”; R. v. Nasogaluak, [2010] S.C.J. No. 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at paras. 40-41
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nasogaluak”]: “Thus, whatever weight a judge may wish to accord to
the objectives listed above [referring to s. 718 Code], the resulting sentence must respect the
fundamental principle of proportionality ... It is clear from these provisions that the principle of
proportionality is central to the sentencing process” (the emphasis is LeBel J.’s); R. v. Pham, [2013]
S.C.J. No. 100, 357 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at paras. 6-7 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Pham”]. On the interpretation
of s. 718.1 of the Code as the fundamental principle of sentencing, see André Jodouin & Marie-Eve
Sylvestre, “Changer les lois, les idées, les pratiques: réflexions sur l’échec de la réforme de la
détermination de la peine” (2009) 50 C. de D. 519, at 529 [hereinafter “Jodouin & Sylvestre”].
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status, however,3 I suggest in this paper that the Supreme Court of Canada
may very well have rediscovered the proportionality principle in the
Ipeelee/Ladue4 decisions. It did so by recognizing this principle for the first
time as a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,5 and by giving more substance to the
notion of degree of responsibility, the too often neglected second component of the proportionality principle.
Ipeelee and Ladue dealt with the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders
convicted of breach of a long-term supervision order (“LTSO”).6 Both
offenders had addiction problems and long criminal records. Ipeelee, an
Inuk man from Iqaluit, Nunavut, was 39 years old when the Court released its decision. His mother was an alcoholic and froze to death when
he was five years old. Ipeelee began consuming alcohol at 11 years old
and quickly became addicted. He accumulated approximately three
dozen convictions for property offences (breaking and entering and theft)
and offences against the administration of justice (failures to comply
with a court order and breaches of probation orders) as a youth offender.
As an adult, he was further convicted of 24 offences of the same type, as
well as violent crimes including aggravated assault causing bodily harm,
aggravated assault, sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily
harm, before being designated as a long-term offender in 2001 and sentenced to a 10-year LTSO which came into effect in 2007 upon his
release from Kingston Penitentiary.7 His LTSO was suspended and therefore Mr. Ipeelee was sent back into custody on four occasions for
violating the conditions of his order, including sleeping in the living
room contrary to house rules, behaviour problems, and being agitated
and refusing urinalysis. He was finally charged with being found intoxicated and in possession of two bottles of alcohol contrary to his LTSO,
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment less
six months of pre-sentence custody in 2009.8

3

Nasogaluak, id., at para. 41. According to LeBel J., the importance of the principle of
proportionality predates the 1996 amendments to the Criminal Code.
4
R. v. Ipeelee; R. v. Ladue, [2012] S.C.J. No. 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Ipeelee/Ladue”].
5
Part I of the Constitutional Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
6
In accordance with Part XXIV of the Code (Dangerous Offenders and Long-Term
Offenders): see s. 752ff.
7
Ipeelee/Ladue, supra, note 4, at paras. 3-11.
8
Id., at paras. 12-14.
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Mr. Ladue is a member of the Ross River Dena Council Band in
Yukon, a community that suffered numerous physical and sexual abuses
from the U.S. Army established in the area in the 1940s to build a pipeline.9 His parents were both alcoholics and died when Ladue was very
young. At five years old, Ladue was sent to residential school, where he
suffered “physical, sexual, emotional and spiritual abuse”.10 Upon his return to his community at nine years old, he felt alienated and began
drinking heavily. He subsequently began consuming opiates while incarcerated in a federal penitentiary. He was convicted of 40 criminal offences
related to property (theft, mischief), alcohol and administration of justice
(failures to comply with court orders). He was also convicted of violent
offences including robberies, assaults and sexual assaults. In 2003, he was
convicted of breaking and entering and sexual assault, designated as a
long-term offender and sentenced to a seven-year LTSO which began in
2006.11 His LTSO was suspended many times for breaches of his conditions, in particular the one prohibiting his use of intoxicants. He was
finally convicted of breaching his order in 2010 after he provided a sample
of urine that tested positive for cocaine. He was sentenced to three years’
imprisonment less five months of pre-sentence custody.12
The Ipeelee/Ladue cases provided an opportunity for the Court to revisit its decisions in R. v. Gladue13 and R. v. Wells14 with respect to the
sentencing of Aboriginal offenders, especially in light of the national
tragedy of their over-representation in the criminal justice system, and in
particular in prisons.15 More specifically, the appeals raised the issue of
whether the interpretative framework set out in these previous decisions
applied in the context of determining a fit sentence for a breach of an
9

Id., at para. 21.
Id., at para. 19.
11
Id., at paras. 22-25.
12
Id., at paras. 26-27.
13
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gladue”].
14
[2000] S.C.J. No. 11, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207 (S.C.C.).
15
See Statistics Canada, Adult correctional services 2010-2011 (Mia Dauvergne) (Ottawa:
Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 2012), online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002x/2012001/article/11715-eng.htm>, at 11. In 2010-2011, Aboriginal, Inuit and Métis people of
Canada accounted for 20 per cent of federal admissions in custody whereas they represented
approximately 3 per cent of the adult population as a whole. The disproportion is even higher among
female Aboriginal offenders, who represented 41 per cent of all federally incarcerated women. At
the provincial level, Aboriginal people are being incarcerated up to 10 times more than their
proportion in the population, accounting respectively for 77.6 per cent and 11.4 per cent of
provincial admissions in custody in Saskatchewan and Ontario whereas they represented 11.9 per
cent and 1.8 per cent of the population.
10
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LTSO. In many respects, this decision is welcome as it represents a real
effort on the part of the Court to address even the harshest criticisms
raised against its previous decisions,16 as well as to produce meaningful
change for Aboriginal offenders.17 This paper will focus on two specific
elements. First, I discuss the implications for sentencing theory and practice of the recognition of proportionality in sentencing as a principle of
fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter by a majority of the
Supreme Court judges. Second, I suggest that these cases may have
given rise to the emergence of a concept of shared or collective responsibility for crime grounded in the notion of “degree of responsibility”.

II. THE RECOGNITION OF PROPORTIONALITY IN SENTENCING
AS A PRINCIPLE OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE UNDER SECTION 7
OF THE CHARTER
In Ipeelee/Ladue, the Supreme Court of Canada formally recognized
for the first time that “proportionality in sentencing could aptly be described as a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter”.18
This short statement was made without any further elaboration on the
part of the Court or any consideration of its implications for sentencing
and criminal law litigation. As a matter of fact, this issue was never argued by the parties in their factum or before the Court.19
The recognition of the constitutional character of the proportionality
principle in sentencing by a majority of the Supreme Court judges appears at first to be a cause for celebration.20 Almost 30 years after the
16

See Ipeelee/Ladue, supra, note 4, at paras. 63-87.
However, this positive trend has not been universal. Certain political statements or appeal
cases post-Ipeelee (e.g., Prime Minister Harper’s reaction to Howard Sapers’ latest report on
Aboriginal overrepresentation in prisons: <http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/03/07/prison_
watchdog_calls_soaring_aboriginal_population_in_jail_a_critical_situation.html> and the majority
reasons in R. v. Popowich, [2013] A.J. No. 356, 544 A.R. 312 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “Popowich”])
tend to promote a more pessimistic view of this issue, while other decisions are more promising: see
the dissenting opinion by Berger J. in Popowich (at para. 28ff.), as well as R. v. G. (L.L.), [2012]
M.J. No. 359, 284 Man. R. (2d) 285, at paras. 31-36 (Man. C.A.) and R. v. Knockwood, [2012] O.J.
No. 1592, 286 C.C.C. (3d) 36 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Knockwood”].
18
Ipeelee/Ladue, supra, note 4, at para. 36.
19
Ipeelee and Ladue, appellant’s and respondent’s Facta. Interestingly, in R. v. Smith, [1987]
S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, at 1060 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Smith”], Lamer J. refrained from
considering s. 7’s relationship with mandatory minimum sentences because the Court lacked “the
benefit of a thorough discussion on these issues” with all the Attorneys General involved.
20
To be sure, in previous cases and most recently in Nasogaluak, supra, note 2, at para. 41,
the Court held that the principle of proportionality in sentencing had a “constitutional dimension, in
that s. 12 of the Charter forbids the imposition of a grossly disproportionate sentence that would
17
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Court’s foundational judgment in the B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference,21 it
is indeed remarkable that section 7 has not been a more important element in the development of sentencing theory.22
Yet, given that the Court does not develop its argument in any way or
refer to any previous cases for guidance, many questions remain unanswered. First, which aspects of the proportionality principle in sentencing
have been constitutionalized? To understand what is at stake, it is helpful
to refer to a conceptual framework developed by Professor Desrosiers in
a recent article on mandatory minimum sentences.23 Building on a distinction made by Lamer J. between the “effect of punishment” and “the
process by which the punishment is imposed” in Smith,24 Desrosiers argues that section 12 is only concerned with the assessment of the actual
sentence or the result of the sentencing process, leaving untouched its
conditions of production or the principles according to which such a result is achieved, which would fall rather in the realm of section 7.25 She
goes on to suggest that the proportionality principle in sentencing entrenched in section 7 has two components: the principle of judicial
discretion and the rational connection between the punishment and the
objectives pursued by Parliament. In Desrosiers’ opinion, the recognition
of the proportionality principle in sentencing in Ipeelee has in fact given
a constitutional status to the first component, namely, judicial discretion,
by recognizing that in the sentencing process and regardless of the end

outrage society’s standards of decency” (LeBel J.). This sentence was repeated word by word
in Ipeelee/Ladue, supra, note 4, at para. 36, but it was also followed by the first explicit reference to
s. 7.
21
Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S 94 (2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference”]; I refer here in particular to the
argument of Wilson J., who suggested that imposing a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment in
the case of an absolute liability offence violated the principle of fundamental justice which required
that a sentence be proportioned to the offence and compatible with the objectives of a penal system
(at 532). Justice Wilson further developed her broader view of proportionality in the context of s. 12
of the Charter in Smith, supra, note 19, at para. 113.
22
As a matter of fact, rights claims have had very little bearing on sentencing: see
Margarida Garcia, Le rapport paradoxal entre les droits de la personne et le droit criminel : les
théories de la peine comme obstacles cognitifs à l’innovation (unpublished Doctoral Thesis,
Sociology Department) (Montréal: Université du Quebec à Montréal, 2010). Section 7, on the other
hand, has had significant importance to the development of mens rea and procedural rights.
23
Julie Desrosiers, “Peines minimales et principes de justice fondamentale : une lecture
comparée des articles 12 et 7 de la Charte” (2013) 17 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 121, at 125 [hereinafter
“Desrosiers”].
24
Smith, supra, note 19, at 1072 and 1075 (the emphasis is Lamer J.’s). At 1072, Lamer J.
also states that “s. 12 governs the quality of the punishment”.
25
Desrosiers, supra, note 23, at 125.
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result, judges must keep sufficient discretion to impose a sentence that
reflects the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the
offender.26 In other words, the Court’s decision in Ipeelee was primarily
concerned with the process by which punishment is imposed and not by
the effect of punishment or the result of the sentencing process.
In that sense, we should acknowledge the importance of the Court’s
recognition of this new principle of fundamental justice in the context of
the proliferation of mandatory minimum sentences that completely annihilate judicial discretion.27 Justice LeBel may very well have provided
scholars and criminal lawyers with the long-awaited way out of the dead
end of section 12 jurisprudence.28 Moreover, the recognition of the proportionality principle may give the parties a more substantial and
permanent, as well as less sensitive, basis to challenge mandatory minimum sentences in cases such as R. v. Nur and R. v. Smickle (now on
appeal) than the issue of Crown discretion at stake in the analysis of the
arbitrariness of the contested legislative scheme.29
26
Id., 140-42. See also Debra Parkes, “Ipeelee and the Pursuit of Proportionality in a World
of Mandatory Minimum Sentences” (2012) 33:3 For the Defence 22-27. Parkes pointed out that the
Court’s emphasis on the “highly individualized” sentencing process is clearly at odds with the
adoption of mandatory minimum sentences.
27
Drawing from a comparative analysis of mandatory minimum penalties in France and in
the U.K., Desrosiers interestingly suggests that the courts should distinguish between mandatory
minimum sentences that do not make room for judicial discretion and that would be unconstitutional,
and those that would preserve such discretion: id., at 142.
28
Since Smith, the courts have upheld all mandatory minimum sentences challenged under
s. 12’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment and considerably limited the scope of this
provision: see Kent Roach, “Searching for Smith: The Constitutionality of Mandatory Minimum
Sentences” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 367. In R. v. Ferguson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R 96
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ferguson”], the Supreme Court further held that a constitutional exemption
was not an appropriate remedy for a s. 12 violation. As a result, legislation imposing minimum
sentences should either be declared unconstitutional based on the facts of the case or on reasonable
hypotheticals and inconsistent with the Charter, or it should be found constitutional. While some
scholars criticized Ferguson as imposing an additional limitation on s. 12 (see, e.g., Lisa
Dufraimont, “R. v. Ferguson and the Search for a Coherent Approach to Mandatory Minimum
Sentences under Section 12” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 459), others argued that Ferguson put new
constitutional pressure on minimum sentences by inviting sentencing judges to strike them down
precisely because constitutional exemptions are not available anymore (e.g., Benjamin Berger, “A
More Lasting Comfort? The Politics of Minimum Sentences, the Rule of Law and R. v. Ferguson”
(2009) 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 101).
29
R. v. Smickle, [2012] O.J. No. 612, 110 O.R. (3d) 25, at paras. 94-95 (Ont. S.C.J.). In that
case, Molloy J. relied on Code J.’s analysis in R. v. Nur, [2011] O.J. No. 3878, 275 C.C.C. (3d) 330,
at paras. 121-143 (Ont. S.C.J.), and found that the legislative scheme for the offence of possession of
a loaded firearm contrary to s. 95(1) of the Code was arbitrary and in violation of s. 7 of the Charter
because of a two-year gap between the sentences that can be imposed on summary convictions
(maximum one year) and on indictment (minimum three years) in the case of a first offence.
According to Molloy J., at para. 92, “by eliminating the entire range of sentences between one year
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But, there might be other (perhaps unintended) consequences to
recognizing proportionality in sentencing as a principle of fundamental
justice. In doing so, the Court may have also subjected the assessment of
the quality of punishment (i.e., the actual result of the sentencing
process) to section 7 scrutiny. In addition to subjecting Parliamentimposed punishment to Charter control, it may have also opened the door
to control judicially imposed sentences. In Smith, Lamer J. made a
distinction between “grossly disproportionate” sentences that trigger
constitutional protection under section 12 and “merely excessive”
sentences that should be left to the usual sentencing appeal process.30 In a
concurring opinion, McIntyre J. further stressed that “while section 7 set
out broad and general rights which often extend over the same ground as
other rights set out in the Charter”, it could not be read so broadly as to
impose “greater restrictions on punishment than section 12 — for
example by prohibiting punishments which were merely excessive”.31 If
it were to do so, section 12 would not serve any practical purpose. This
was apparently confirmed by the Court in R. v. Malmo-Levine, where the
Court stated that both section 12 and section 7 included the same “gross
disproportionality” standard in order to preserve the Charter’s internal
consistency:
Is there then a principle of fundamental justice embedded in s. 7 that
would give rise to a constitutional remedy against a punishment that
does not infringe s. 12? We do not think so. To find that gross and
excessive disproportionality of punishment is required under s. 12 but a
lesser degree of proportionality suffices under s. 7 would render
incoherent the scheme of interconnected “legal rights” set out in ss. 7 to 14
of the Charter by attributing contradictory standards to ss. 12 and 7 in
relation to the same subject matter. Such a result, in our view, would be
unacceptable.32

Recent cases including Ipeelee may, however, allow us to reconsider
this relation of correspondence between section 7 and section 12. First, in
various cases including Malmo-Levine, the Court held that the Charter
and three years, the effect of the legislation is to constrain the flexibility of the hybrid procedure and
significantly limit Crown discretion” as well as “emasculat[ing] the safety valve that the Crown
discretion to proceed by summary conviction supposedly represents”.
30
Smith, supra, note 19, at 1072. Reaffirmed in Steele v. Mountain Institution, [1990] S.C.J.
No. 111, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1385, at 1417 (S.C.C.), referred to in Desrosiers, supra, note 23, at 133, n. 49.
31
Smith, supra, note 19, at 1107 (McIntyre J., concurring).
32
[2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at paras. 160-161 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Malmo-Levine”].
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provisions should be “mutually reinforcing”33 and that the “content of
section 7 was not limited to the sum of sections 8 to 14 of the Charter”.34
Moreover, there are other indications that the Court is open to reconsider
the respective scope of both section 7 and section 12. For instance, in
Nasogaluak, the Court accepted the sentencing judge’s finding that the
police’s excessive use of force against the defendant did not amount to a
section 12 breach, but constituted a violation of section 7 of the
Charter.35
More fundamentally, the distinction between “grossly disproportionate” sentences that could trigger constitutional protection under section 12
and “merely excessive” sentences that would be shielded from constitutional review and would instead be dealt with through the appeal process
is highly questionable.36 How can a sentence be “merely” excessive? The
expression itself is an oxymoron. Excessive, by definition, describes a
degree that exceeds what is normal, reasonable or tolerable. But what is
normal or reasonable when it comes to sentencing? For instance, should
sentences be compared to the general ranges of sentences for particular
offences,37 or to their departure from the more controversial “starting
points”,38 or to societal standards of decency or humanity such as those
33
R. v. Lyons, [1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, at 326 (S.C.C.); Gosselin v.
Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, at para. 144 (S.C.C.).
34
B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 21, at 502-503; Malmo-Levine, supra, note 32,
at para. 169. See for instance the respective scope of s. 7 and s. 11(c) with respect to the right to
silence: Desrosiers, supra, note 23, at 138.
35
Nasogaluak, supra, note 2, at para. 15. This finding had also been confirmed by the Court
of Appeal ([2007] A.J. No. 1217, 229 C.C.C. (3d) 52, at para. 27 (Alta. C.A.)). See the Court of
Queen’s Bench decision: [2005] A.J. No. 1741, 90 Alta. L.R. (4th) 294, at paras. 5-11 (Alta. Q.B.).
36
See Desrosiers, supra, note 23, at 133, n. 49.
37
Nasogaluak, supra, note 2, at para. 44 (in French: “fourchettes générales de peines
applicables à certaines infractions”). According to LeBel J., however, general ranges should be
understood as “guidelines rather than hard and fast rules”. A sentence falling outside such ranges can
still be considered a fit sentence. See Pham, supra, note 2, at para. 18.
38
In R. v. Arcand, [2010] A.J. No. 1383, 264 C.C.C. (3d) 134 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter
“Arcand”], a majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta held that starting points should be used as
sentencing tools to minimize unjustified disparity in sentencing (para. 118). This conclusion was
adopted after Fraser C.J.A. summarized the sentencing process in Canada as follows in her reasons
(at para. 8):
We must face up to five sentencing truths. First, it is notorious amongst judges, of whom
there are now approximately 2,100 in this country at three court levels, that one of the
most controversial subjects, both in theory and practical application is sentencing. That
takes us to the second truth. The proposition that if judges knew the facts of a given case,
they would all agree, or substantially agree on the result, is simply not so. The third truth.
Judges are not the only ones who know truths one and two, and thus judge shopping is
alive and well in Canada — and fighting hard to stay that way. All lead inescapably to the
fourth truth. Without reasonable uniformity of approach to sentencing amongst trial and

(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d)

THE (RE)DISCOVERY OF PROPORTIONALITY

469

developed in the context of section 12 in order to be found “merely excessive”? And how can “merely excessive” sentences not violate the
right to life, liberty and security of the person protected by section 7 of
the Charter?
After Ipeelee, the courts might be asked to distinguish “demonstrably
unfit” sentences that would be dealt with through the appeal process
from disproportionate sentences that would trigger Charter review under
section 7 and “grossly disproportionate sentences that outrage society’s
standards of decency”,39 which would be challenged under section 12.
The standard of “arbitrarily disproportionate sentences” developed in the
context of mandatory minimal sentences by lower courts could easily be
adapted to sanction excessive sentences, allowing the courts to respect
the principle of the sentencing judge’s discretion while protecting the
rights of the accused against the kind of arbitrariness that makes a difference between long-term incarceration and community surveillance.40 In
addition to preserving its own symbolic power by sanctioning grossly
disproportionate sentences that outrage society’s standards of decency,
section 12 would still remain relevant to declare unconstitutional cruel
and unusual forms of punishment, such as the infliction of corporal punishment, “such as the lash”, the “lobotomisation of certain dangerous
offenders”, “the castration of sexual offenders”41 or the death penalty.42
appellate judges in Canada, many of the sentencing objectives and principles prescribed
in the Code are not attainable. This makes the search for just sanctions at best a lottery
and at worst a myth. Pretending otherwise obscures the need for Canadian courts to do
what Parliament has asked: minimize unjustified disparity in sentencing while maintaining flexibility. The final truth. If the courts do not act to vindicate the promises of the
law, and public confidence diminishes, then Parliament will.
The use of starting points has generated a lot of controversy in appellate court decisions: see
for instance the decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v. Sandercock, [1985] A.J. No. 817,
22 C.C.C. (3d) 79 (Alta. C.A.). In R. v. McDonnell, [1997] S.C.J. No. 42, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 948
(S.C.C.), the Supreme Court has seriously constrained, if not condemned, their use by appeal courts.
The Court’s decision in Nasogaluak, supra, note 2, also seems to be following along these lines.
39
R. v. Morrissey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90, at para. 26 (S.C.C.), confirmed
in R. v. Wiles, [2005] S.C.J. No. 53, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 895, at para. 4 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Ferguson,
supra, note 28, at para. 14.
40
An example of this is found in R. v. Proulx, [2000] S.C.J. No. 6, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, at
para. 130 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Proulx”], where Lamer J. held that while the trial judge had imposed
a sentence of 18 months in prison, “were [he] a trial judge, [he] might have found that a conditional
sentence would have been appropriate in this case”.
41
Smith, supra, note 19, at 1073-74, holding that these punishments and treatments “will
always be grossly disproportionate and will always outrage our standards of decency ...”.
42
While referring to the debates held in the context of the Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C.
1960, c. 44 (see, e.g., R. v. Miller, [1975] B.C.J. No. 1040, 24 C.C.C. (2d) 401 (B.C.C.A.)), the
Supreme Court refrained from declaring that the death penalty would be a cruel and unusual
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One last question remains to be dealt with: what does proportionality
in sentencing mean in the context of section 7? The concept of proportionality has no content in and of itself. It needs to rely on some other
theory or principle, or it remains a measuring instrument, reflecting a
relationship between two parts, standing for a relation of correspondence,
commensurateness, balance or harmony. Will the principle of proportionality recognized as a principle of fundamental justice in the context of
section 7 serve as a moderating or restraining principle, or will it be used
to nullify sentences on the ground that they are insufficiently afflictive?
In other words, is proportionality a ceiling, requiring that a sentence not
exceed what is just and appropriate, or can it also be a threshold, requiring that a sentence be imposed, and reflecting and condemning offenders’
participation to the offence and the harm caused?43
In cases such as Proulx44 and R. v. Fice,45 the Supreme Court clearly
interpreted proportionality under section 718.1 of the Criminal Code as a
threshold by endorsing just desert theory, which generally implies an
obligation and a duty to punish in the first place as well as the idea that
the punishment must be sufficiently afflictive in order to be just and
appropriate.46
More recently, LeBel J. stated that the proportionality principle included these two perspectives — the restraining and the just desert
perspectives, which “converged in a sentence that both speaks out against
the offence and punishes the offender no more than is necessary”.47 This
was confirmed in Ipeelee, where LeBel J. held that both components of
the proportionality principle are important: “in the Canadian criminal
justice system, a just sanction is one that reflects both perspectives on
proportionality and does not elevate one at the expense of the other”.48
Can we expect the proportionality principle as a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 to follow the same interpretation that it
was given pursuant to section 718.1 of the Criminal Code? If this were
punishment under s. 12 of the Charter in Smith. The Court has, however, expressed its opinion in
the context of extradition: United States of America v. Burns, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001]
1 S.C.R. 283 (S.C.C.).
43
For a discussion of the multiple conceptions of proportionality, see Jodouin & Sylvestre,
supra, note 2, at 533-39.
44
Supra, note 40.
45
[2005] S.C.J. No. 30, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 742 (S.C.C.).
46
Andrew Von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing. Exploring the
Principles (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
47
Nasogaluak, supra, note 2, at para. 42.
48
Ipeelee/Ladue, supra, note 4, at para. 37.
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the case, the constitutionalization of the proportionality principle could
represent good news for the Crown who has a more limited basis of
appeal in sentencing and might now be allowed to challenge a disproportionate sentence on the basis that it is insufficiently afflictive under
section 7 of the Charter.49
The answer to this question, however, lies in the interpretation of the
nature and purposes of the legal rights protected under section 7. The
constitutionalization of the proportionality principle may ultimately give
the courts the opportunity to reaffirm that section 7’s legal rights were
not meant to protect the state, societal interests or more specifically victims of crimes, but to protect the accused whose life, security and liberty
interests are threatened by the state in the context of the criminal trial,50
departing from cases such as Cunningham v. Canada,51 in which it held
that the principles of fundamental justice are also concerned with the
protection of society. In doing so, the Court would give priority to the
limiting and restraining perspective over the just desert perspective of the
proportionality principle, and would justify the existence of a distinct
challenge for arbitrarily disproportionate sentences under section 7 of the
Charter on solid interpretative grounds.

III. THE EMERGING CONCEPT OF SHARED OR COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY IN SENTENCING OR TAKING “DEGREE(S) OF
RESPONSIBILITY” SERIOUSLY
Ipeelee also allows us to think about shared or collective responsibility
in Canadian criminal law as an integral part of the proportionality principle,
and in particular grounded in the concept of “degree of responsibility”.
Of course, individual responsibility is one of the most fundamental
principles, if not the most fundamental principle, governing our criminal
law. When it comes to culpability, we simply take for granted that
responsibility is imposed on individuals — one at a time based on their
49
Sections 676 and 687 of the Criminal Code, not to mention the restricted standard of
review applicable on appeal of sentencing decisions: R. v. Shropshire, [1995] S.C.J. No. 52, [1995]
4 S.C.R. 227, at para. 46 (S.C.C.); R. v. M. (C.A.), [1996] S.C.J. No. 28, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 91
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “M. (C.A.)”].
50
André Jodouin, “La Charte canadienne et la nouvelle légalité” in E. Mendes & G.
Beaudoin, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1996), c. 14.
51
[1993] S.C.J. No. 47, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143, at 151-52 (S.C.C.); see also R. v. Cook, [1997]
S.C.J. No. 22, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1113 (S.C.C.); R. v. Demers, [2004] S.C.J. No. 43, [2004] 2 S.C.R.
489 (S.C.C.); R. v. B. (D.), [2008] S.C.J. No. 25, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
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personal and individual choices.52 This is so fundamental that we cannot
even imagine that responsibility could be allocated differently.
In R. v. Nette, Arbour J. stated that “criminal law does not recognize
contributory negligence, nor does it have any mechanism to apportion
responsibility for the harm occasioned by criminal conduct, except at
sentencing when causation has been established”.53 Sentencing principles
allegedly provide balance to otherwise inflexible culpability decisions
structured around dichotomies and calling for exclusive decisions such as
guilty or not guilty, reasonable or unreasonable, morally voluntary or morally
involuntary, which do not allow for any shades of grey. Arguably then,
degrees of responsibility should be considered at the sentencing stage.54
However, the multiplication of mandatory minimal sentences alluded
to in the second part of this article and the emphasis put by recent Criminal Code modifications on utilitarian objectives such as denunciation and
deterrence have considerably limited judicial discretion in the past decades.55 Moreover, despite the explicit recognition of degrees of
responsibility in section 718.1 of the Criminal Code since 1995, the
courts have not been clear on their meaning. In some cases, “degree of
responsibility” seems to merely duplicate the analysis conducted at the
culpability stage, referring to the mens rea or to defences which might
not have been accepted to negate criminal liability but are still relevant to
assess the overall moral blameworthiness of the offender.56 In other
cases, “degree of responsibility” has been linked to “any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offender” pursuant to
52
Alan Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law, 2d ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) [hereinafter “Norrie”].
53
[2001] S.C.J. No. 75, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 488, at para. 49 (S.C.C.). In contrast, in both civil
liability and tort law, there are mechanisms for apportionment of fault in accordance with the parties’
share of responsibility, including that of the victims.
54
See Marie-Eve Sylvestre, “Rethinking Criminal Responsibility for Poor Offenders:
Choice, Monstrosity and the Logic of Practice” (2010) 55 McGill L.J. 771, at 811ff. [hereinafter
“Sylvestre”], where I argue that we should recognize degrees of responsibility at the culpability
stage, among other things because the balanced nature of criminal law (i.e., inflexible culpability
decisions and flexible sentencing decisions) was foremost a legal fiction.
55
See, e.g., ss. 718.01, 718.02 and 742.1 of the Code. This is, of course, not to say that
retributivism or just desert theory cannot produce extremely repressive results, quite the contrary:
see James Q. Whitman, “A Plea against Retributivism” (2003-2004) 7 Buff. Crim. L.R. 85. See also
M. (C.A.), supra, note 49, at para. 80.
56
E.g., R. v. Balcha, [2004] O.J. No. 1217, 184 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at paras. 24-54 (Ont. C.A.);
R. v. Keshane, [2005] S.J. No. 97, 257 Sask. R. 161, at para. 28 (Sask. C.A.); R. c. Rodrigue, [2008]
J.Q. no 11994, [2008] R.J.Q. 2594, at para. 28 (Que. C.A.). In at least one case, the Quebec Court of
Appeal considered motives or interests pursued by the offender in order to assess his degree of
responsibility: see Fournier c. R., [2012] J.Q. no 6681, at para. 50 (Que. C.A.).
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section 718.2(a) of the Code.57 But generally speaking, the courts have
mostly undermined the degree of responsibility aspect of the proportionality principle in favour of the assessment of the gravity of the offence,58
or have emphasized the importance of balancing this principle with that
of the parity of sentences.59 In that sense, the balanced nature of criminal
law theory was mostly a false and empty promise and we have fallen
short of really discussing what degrees of responsibility could mean if
we were, for instance, to think about shared responsibility or responsibility in collective terms, beyond individual and personal responsibility.60
I want to suggest that things may have started to change in Ipeelee as
the Supreme Court created some space for considering social, economic
and political aspects of crime in recognizing the responsibility of state
agents (and eventually of the state) in the perpetration of crime.
To be sure, this movement was initiated to some extent before
Ipeelee. In Nasogaluak, the Court clarified the case law with respect to
the relationship between state misconduct and mitigation of sentences.
Nasogaluak was a case of police brutality in which the accused, a man of
Inuit and Dene descent, suffered broken ribs and a collapsed lung as a
result of his violent arrest and detention. The trial judge refused to stay
the proceedings, but nonetheless agreed to reduce the sentence to a conditional discharge to remedy the Charter breaches.61
Justice LeBel, writing for the Court, held that when a Charter breach
is established, a reduction of sentence constitutes an appropriate remedy
57
See Arcand, supra, note 38, at paras. 58-60; see also, e.g., R. v. Taylor, [2010] M.J. No.
355, 263 C.C.C. (3d) 307 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Setz, [2012] A.J. No. 1166, 536 A.R. 249 (Alta. C.A.)
[hereinafter “Setz”].
58
Proulx, supra, note 40, at para. 54; Anne-Marie Boisvert & André Jodouin, “De
l’intention à l’incurie : le déclin de la culpabilité morale en droit pénal canadien” (2002) 32 R.G.D.
759, at 781-89. See also Fournier c. R., supra, note 56, at para. 46.
59
Section 718.2(b) of the Code: “a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on
similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances”. See, e.g., Popowich,
supra, note 17, at para. 17.
60
To be sure, in some cases, the courts have taken into account the relative degree of
responsibility amongst parties to a crime distinguishing between the leader of the group or followers: see,
for instance, R. v. Overacker, [2005] A.J. No. 855, 198 C.C.C. (3d) 472, at para. 23 (Alta. C.A.); Arcand,
supra, note 38, at para. 60; Setz, supra, note 57; and R. c. Demers, [2008] J.Q. no 9499, at paras. 8-13
(Que. C.A.). While this is an interesting development, it does not go as far as considering the
responsibility of parties who have not been accused of any crime — in some cases, the difference
between the victim and the offender is a matter of considering when the police arrived at a crime scene, or
who survived an accident — or the state’s responsibility as a contributing party in a conflictual situation.
61
Nasogaluak, supra, note 2, at paras. 14-17; other cases have dealt with similar issues by
ordering or confirming a stay of proceedings: R. v. Bellusci, [2012] S.C.J. No. 44, [2012] 2 S.C.R.
509 (S.C.C.); R. v. Tran, [2010] O.J. No. 2785, 103 O.R. (3d) 131 (Ont. C.A.).
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for state misconduct related to the circumstances of the offence or the
offender in the context of section 24(1) of the Charter.62 But more importantly perhaps, he stated that it was “neither necessary nor useful”
to invoke section 24(1) of the Charter to obtain a reduction of sentence.
Police violence or other state misconduct related to the circumstances of
the offence or the offender, including but not limited to state misconduct
that amounts to a Charter breach, are also relevant factors in crafting a fit
and proportionate sentence following the statutory sentencing regime
established in the Criminal Code.63 The Court even goes as far as to suggest that in some exceptional cases the judge could impose a sentence
reduction outside statutory limits or, in other words, a sentence that could
not comply with mandatory minimums and other provisions prohibiting
certain forms of sentences, for “some particularly egregious form of misconduct by state agents”.64
In Nasogaluak, LeBel J. also reviewed several other cases, including
pre-Charter cases, in which state misconduct was considered as a mitigating factor in sentencing. These include cases of police violence,
excessive but not unconstitutional delays attributable to the police or to
the prosecution, and unlawful searches.65 In all these cases, a reduction
of sentence appears to have been imposed because the courts were of the
opinion that the defender had already suffered some kind of punishment
(either physically66 or as a result of the criminal process). None of these
cases, however, except maybe one in which the police were involved in
the offender’s actions although not enough to trigger the application of
the defence of entrapment,67 reconsidered the degree of responsibility of
the offender or addressed the issue of the role of the state in the perpetration of the crime.
62

Nasogaluak, id., at paras. 5 and 57, referring to R. v. Mills, [1986] S.C.J. No. 39, [1986]
1 S.C.R. 863, at 974 (S.C.C.).
63
Nasogaluak, id., at paras. 2-4, 53-55. See R. v. Knockwood, [2012] O.J. No. 1592, 286
C.C.C. (3d) 36, at paras. 57, 72-73 (Ont. S.C.J.), where the sentencing judge reduced the offender’s
sentence for importation of heroin from the normal range of 12 to 17 years of incarceration to
six years of incarceration for state misconduct. In this case, Quebec probation services prepared a
delayed sentencing report that had no Gladue (see supra, note 13) content in it, and submitted it in
French only even though the accused did not speak or read French.
64
Nasogaluak, id., at paras. 5-6, 55. This statement also goes to strengthen the position
taken by Desrosiers, supra, note 23.
65
Nasogaluak, id., at paras. 53-54.
66
The fact that courts considered physical infliction of pain as an equivalent of punishment
is questionable.
67
R. v. Kirzner, [1976] O.J. No. 2364, 14 O.R. (2d) 665 (Ont. C.A.), cited in Nasogaluak,
supra, note 2, at para. 54.
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This is precisely where the Ipeelee/Ladue decisions take us. This
case is unique for two reasons. First, it goes beyond the context of police
violence or other rights violations that may or may not amount to Charter
breach that can be considered as mitigating circumstances in sentencing
to consider the responsibility of state agents and of the state in the perpetration of crime. Most specifically, the Court examines the role of the
criminal justice system itself, as well as that of the state more generally,
in violating fundamental human rights and creating conditions of social
and economic deprivation that may create conflicts that are criminalized.
Second, such a discussion is grounded in the concept of “degree of
responsibility”.68
The linkage between state misconduct and the concept of degree of
responsibility appears clearly in both the majority and the dissent opinions. In dissent, Rothstein J. discusses the sentencing of Mr. Ladue who
was charged with breaching his LTSO for having consumed opiates. At
the time of his arrest, Mr. Ladue had been designated by the Correctional
Service of Canada (“CSC”) to be sent to Linkage House in Kamloops,
where he was to have received culturally specific rehabilitative support,
but he was instead sent to the Belkin House in downtown Vancouver.
Justice Rothstein writes that while he does not “absolve Mr. Ladue of
responsibility for his own conduct”, it was the CSC’s error that “caused
him to be placed in an environment where, having regard to his known
addiction, he was especially vulnerable to breaching his LTSO”.69 Therefore, “this is not a situation where the offender failed to take up an
opportunity that the criminal justice system had given him to rehabilitate.
Rather, the system’s bureaucratic error deprived him of that opportunity.
The CSC must bear some ‘degree of responsibility’ for Mr. Ladue’s
breach.”70
Such a statement, made by the same judge who held in British
Columbia v. Zastowny that inmates are not entitled to compensation for
lost wages resulting from their incarceration because they are personally
responsible for their acts and their consequences, regardless of the fact
68
To be sure, this is not the first time that courts discuss systemic and background factors in
sentencing in the context of the proportionality principle, but Ipeelee/Ladue has the merits of making
the connection with the State particularly explicit. See Marie-Eve Sylvestre, “The Redistributive
Potential of Section 7 of the Charter: Incorporating Socio-economic Context in Criminal Law and in
the Adjudication of Rights” (2011) 42 Ottawa L. Rev. 389 [hereinafter “Sylvestre, ‘The
Redistributive Potential’”].
69
Ipeelee/Ladue, supra, note 4, at para. 154.
70
Id., at para. 156 (emphasis added).
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that in that case, Zastowny’s incarceration was directly related to him
being sexually assaulted by a state agent (a prison guard),71 should not be
underestimated. It should also be read in the context of the Correctional
Investigator of Canada’s report stating that the federal government has
failed to meet its obligations pursuant to the Corrections and Conditional
Release Act and to provide Aboriginal-specific facilities, rehabilitative
programs and financial support.72 This should finally be read in a context
of prisons overcrowding across the country and the issuance of a doublebunking cell capacity directive.73
Justice LeBel, who writes for the majority, agrees that this “bureaucratic
error” should have been considered in sentencing, but he goes much further.
First, he notes that Mr. Ladue’s breach is directly connected to the fact that
he is addicted to opiates, a form of drug which “he first began using while
incarcerated in a federal penitentiary”.74 In doing so, LeBel J. points to the
impact of incarceration and of the criminal justice system itself in the
perpetration of crime. The connection between incarceration and crime is
well documented. In fact, prisons and the criminal justice system have been
denounced as failures since their inception. Foucault convincingly showed
that the history of imprisonment did not follow a linear progression with first
its establishment, then its critiques and successive reforms. Instead, the
institution was unanimously criticized from the very beginning for being
ineffective in reducing crime rates, for causing recidivism and for producing
(and reproducing) delinquents.75 Justice LeBel further recognized the role
played by the criminal justice system and in particular by some sentencing
decisions in the increased crime rates, when he suggested that judges should
make sure sentences effectively rehabilitate offenders and address the
“ongoing systemic racial discrimination”.76
It is finally no coincidence that the Ipeelee and Ladue cases dealt
with breaches. In fact, administration of justice charges, including failure
to appear in court, breaches of probation and failure to comply with a
court order, are the most frequent federal statute charges and account for

71

British Columbia v. Zastowny, [2008] S.C.J. No. 4, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 27 (S.C.C.).
Office of the Correctional Investigator, Spirit Matters — Aboriginal Offenders and the
Corrections and Conditional Release Act, October 2012. See Corrections and Conditional Release
Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20.
73
Commissioner’s Directive, Inmate Accommodation, 2013-02-05: “[T]he Institutional
Head … may increase double-bunking cell capacity”.
74
Id., at para. 96.
75
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), at 264-65.
76
Ipeelee/Ladue, supra, note 4, at para. 67.
72
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21 per cent of charges before adult criminal courts in Canada.77 The
significance of such process offences78 is particularly troubling because
they often end up criminalizing behaviour that would not have been
regarded as criminal if it were not included in a court order, such as in the
case of Mr. Ladue and Mr. Ipeelee, consumption of alcohol, sleeping in the
living room contrary to house rules or being agitated. There is a strong
case for arguing that the criminal justice system (i.e., prosecutors and
judges) is responsible for keeping certain offenders under constant judicial
surveillance, thus creating the conditions for the perpetration of crime.
This is particularly true when one considers the historical and political
explanations of alcohol abuse among Aboriginals.
This brings us directly to LeBel J.’s consideration of systemic and
historical factors. In his opinion, systemic factors “shed some light on
[the offender]’s level of moral blameworthiness”. In referring to the “degree
of responsibility” component of the proportionality principle, LeBel J.
suggests that the “legacy of colonialism”79 as well as the existence of
“social and economic deprivation with a lack of opportunities and limited
option” should be taken into account in crafting a proportionate sentence.80 In doing so, he opens the door to the adoption of a broader
understanding of crime and responsibility: a conception of responsibility
that socializes individual choice,81 emphasizes the collectivization of
risks and draws moral condemnation to the social, economic and political
order in which social conflicts are embedded.82 Problematic situations or
conflicts that the state chooses to criminalize83 are not merely the result
of actions undertaken by individuals who have immediate personal interests, but instead are the result of relationships and interactions embedded
77
Public Safety Canada, 2012 Corrections and Conditional Release Statistical Overview,
December 2012: <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2012-ccrs/index-eng.aspx#a5>, at 9;
in 2008, this number was up to 24 per cent.
78
Erin Murphy, “Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext and Criminal Justice” (2009)
97 Geo. L.J. 1435.
79
Ipeelee/Ladue, supra, note 4, at para. 77.
80
Id., at para. 73.
81
Norrie, supra, note 52, at 36.
82
Sylvestre, supra, note 54. See also Benjamin Berger, “Mental Disorder and the Instability
of Blame in Criminal Law” in François Tanguay-Renaud & James Stribopoulos, Rethinking
Criminal Law Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational
and International Criminal Law (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2012).
83
It is clear that there are multiple conflicts which the state chooses not to criminalize by
referring to other normative systems such as regulatory and administrative law, civil law, etc.: see
Joao Gustavo Vieira Velloso, “Beyond Criminocentric Dogmatism: Mapping Institutional Forms of
Punishment in Contemporary Societies” (2013) 15 Punishment and Society 166.
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in social and economic systems, dynamics of power, political and cultural resistance, as well as daily survival.84 In reconsidering moral
blameworthiness in this light, sentencing judges should then be open to
reduce and indeed nullify some offenders’ sentences based on their actual
degree of responsibility.85
Critics have argued that the individualized and particularized
sentencing process set out in Ipeelee for Aboriginal offenders runs the
risk of appropriating and essentializing indigenous communities and
individuals. They suggest that we cannot solve the problem of overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in the criminal justice system by
emphasizing and perpetuating difference and discrimination. Instead,
they propose that we should resist portraying Aboriginals as addicts and
violent criminals. In doing so, the courts are denying them their human
dignity and depriving them of agency over their own lives.86
These are indeed important critiques, some of which are addressed
by LeBel J. in Ipeelee.87 I agree that there is clearly no causal relation
between crime and poverty or crime and Aboriginal identity: after all,
Aboriginal people do not all commit crime. Moreover, such specious
associations between crime and Aboriginal people divert attention away
from the race and class biases in crime prosecution.88 For instance, studies have shown how law enforcement strategies have a disparate impact
on the poor, minorities and Aboriginal people, in particular as the police
target some people based on prejudices and discriminatory attitudes.89 In

84
This conception of crime draws from insights from Marx, Bourdieu and Foucault. See,
e.g., Philippe Bourgois & Jeff Schonberg, Righteous Dopefiend (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2009) and Sylvestre, supra, note 54, where I build on Bourdieu’s work to develop a
practice theory of responsibility.
85
Barbara Hudson, “Beyond Proportionate Punishment: Difficult Cases and the 1991
Criminal Justice Act” (1995) 22 Crime, L. & Soc. Change 59.
86
Jeannette Gevikoglu, “Ipeelee/Ladue and the Conundrum of Indigenous Identity in
Sentencing”, in this volume. See also Sonia N. Lawrence & Toni Williams, “Swallowed Up: Drug
Couriers at the Borders of Canadian Sentencing” (2006) 56 U.T.L.J. 285 [hereinafter “Lawrence &
Williams”] on the misleading association between race and criminality.
87
With respect to the appropriateness of the judicial forum to address Aboriginal overrepresentation in Canada’s prisons, see Ipeelee/Ladue, supra, note 4, at paras. 65-70.
88
See Lawrence & Williams, supra, note 86, at 330-31.
89
M. Jackson, “Locking Up Natives In Canada: A Report of the Committee of the Canadian
Bar Association on Imprisonment and Release” (1989) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 220; Paul Eid,
Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse du Québec, Profilage racial et
discrimination systémique des jeunes racisés (Montréal, 2011); Christine Campbell & Paul Eid,
Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, La judiciarisation des personnes
itinérantes à Montréal : un cas de profilage social (Montréal, 2009); Commission on Systemic
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self-reported surveys about criminality, surprisingly high numbers of
people (from 75 per cent to 90 per cent), regardless of their social class
or ethnicity, admit having committed illegal acts without having being
charged or prosecuted.90 This being said, we cannot deny the impact of
poverty, racism and the legacy of colonialism on Aboriginal people’s living conditions and thus, potentially on life opportunities. The recognition
that human action and behaviour is embedded in socio-economic contexts
does not deny Aboriginal people’s autonomy and free will. On the contrary,
it rather acknowledges the objective structural constraints in which
individual choices are made and it emphasizes the role of the state in
perpetuating these living conditions.91
To understand how we can at once recognize human agency and
take social, economic and political structures and constraints into account,
it might be helpful to refer to the distinction between agency and freedom of choice put forward by Garland.92 According to Garland, agency
is a universal attribute possessed in the abstract by human beings, while
freedom of choice is the ability to choose and exercise one’s free will
when faced with concrete situations and is therefore always a question
of degree:
The idea of agency refers to the capacity of an agent for action. ...
Agency is a universal attribute of (socialized) human beings ...,
freedom generally refers to a capacity to choose one’s actions without
external constraints. Freedom (unlike agency) is necessarily a matter of
degree — it is the configured range of unconstrained choice in which
agency can operate.93

Speaking of structural constraints in the case of Aboriginal offenders,
the state must bear its share of responsibility for the violence and gross
human rights violations it forced upon Aboriginal communities through
colonialism, the imposition of the residential schools program and the
Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the
Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995).
90
Law Commission of Canada, What Is a Crime? Challenges and Alternatives —
Discussion Paper (Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 2003).
91
See Knockwood, supra, note 17, for a good example of how a sentencing judge assessed
an Aboriginal offender’s degree of moral blameworthiness in context.
92
Barbara Hudson, “Punishment, Poverty and Responsibility: The Case for a Hardship
Defence” (1999) 8 Soc. & Leg. Stud. 583, at 584.
93
David Garland, “Governmentality and the Problem of Crime: Foucault, Criminology,
Sociology” (1997) 1 Theoretical Criminology 173, at 196-97. See also Sylvestre, supra, note 54,
where I discuss Bourdieu’s notion of habitus as avoiding the pitfalls of the dichotomies between
structure and agency.
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current social and economic conditions in which Aboriginal people live.
It should also be held responsible for discriminatory law enforcement
practices, which make it more likely for some individuals or groups to
end up in the criminal justice system. Mr. Ladue and Mr. Ipeelee’s lives
are embedded in such institutional violence and systemic discrimination:
Mr. Ladue, for example, was sent to residential school at five years old
and suffered serious abuse there,94 and comes from a community whose
members also suffered abuse from the U.S. Army some decades ago.
Mr. Ipeelee saw his mother freeze to death at a young age and he was an
alcoholic at the age of 12. This reasoning should finally be extended to
other non-Aboriginal offenders undergoing state violence and systemic
discrimination such as poor and homeless people, immigrants and racial
minorities.95
Finally, the consideration of historical and systemic factors in sentencing will be more secured and less subject to criticism such as that
arising in the aftermath of Gladue and addressed by the Court in Ipeelee,
for example, referring to race-based exemptions or automatic reduction
of sentences, if it is grounded in the concept of degree of responsibility
and the possibility of shared or collective responsibility for crime.

IV. CONCLUSION
In Ipeelee/Ladue, the Court may very well have rediscovered the
proportionality principle in sentencing. First, by giving it a new constitutional status, it has struck a (hopefully fatal) blow to mandatory
minimum sentences imposed by Parliament that are incompatible with
the judicial discretion needed by the sentencing exercise, and it has provided an opportunity to strike a new balance between sections 7 and 12
of the Charter in cases of arbitrarily disproportionate sentences imposed
by a diverse body of sentencing judges. Second, by opening the door to a

94

Ipeelee/Ladue, supra, note 4, at para. 19.
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discussion of shared and collective responsibility for crime, Ipeelee
has brought some fresh air to scholars and criminal lawyers who hope
to introduce considerations of social, economic and political factors in
sentencing and has sent a clear invitation to sentencing judges to assess
the state’s responsibility in the perpetration of crimes and to reduce or
nullify offenders’ sentences based on their degree of responsibility.

